HRN has submitted a civil society report to the Human Rights Committee on civil and political rights (CPR) issues in Japan under the rules of the ICCPR treaty reporting duties. The report aids the Committee in its examination of the Japanese government’s CPR report at its upcoming 136th session in considering the government’s compliance with the ICCPR. We consider nine categories of CPR issues in the report, with recommendations to the Japanese government for each category.<\/p>\n
The categories are:<\/p>\n
You can read our full report below and from the following link in PDF format: HRN 2022 CCPR Shadow Report on Japan.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n The report is also available on the UN website for the Committee 136th session where Japan’s report will be reviewed, under the headings “Japan > Info from Civil Society Organizations (for the session)”: https:\/\/tbinternet.ohchr.org\/_layouts\/15\/treatybodyexternal\/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=2575&Lang=en<\/a><\/p>\n I. Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n HRN is making this submission in advance of the Human Rights Committee\u2019s (the Committee) examination of Japan\u2019s seventh periodic report (CCPR\/C\/JPN\/7) on the measures taken to implement its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant), and HRN appreciates the questions and issues which were raised in the List of Issues adopted by the Committee (CCPR\/C\/JPN\/QPR\/7).<\/p>\n This submission provides an overview of major concerns HRN has about the Japanese government\u2019s compliance with its obligations under the Covenant. It highlights concerns with respect to a number of issues:<\/p>\n II. Restrictions on Press, Academic, and Artistic Expression and Assemblies<\/strong> (Articles 19,<\/strong> 21)<\/strong><\/p>\n The Japanese government has recently taken several measures to restrict journalistic, academic and artistic expression, which in practice have suppressed information and opinions critical of the government. Recently passed legislation has the potential to further crack down on freedom of expression and access to information.<\/p>\n a. Secrets Law<\/p>\n The government of Japan continues to enforce the 2013 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, which imposes significant penalties on anyone, including whistleblowers and journalists, who leaks a government secret.[1]<\/a> The law\u2019s ambiguous definition of \u201csecret\u201d and the lack of oversight on secret designations create opportunities for officials to hide government activities from legitimate public scrutiny.[2]<\/a> While an independent Cabinet Office-based inspectorate and oversight boards in the Japanese Diet have nominal oversight powers, in practice the oversight boards rarely review classified documents to confirm the validity of the secret designation.[3]<\/a> Even without active prosecutions, arbitrary application of the Act impedes the right to access information.<\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 b. Restrictions on assemblies and media coverage near military facilities<\/p>\n Amidst significant protests against a new U.S. military base on Okinawa, in 2021, the Japanese government passed a law restricting land use near military bases which effectively criminalizes peaceful protests near military bases and prevents media coverage of such protests without justification.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 c. Intimidation of journalists<\/p>\n Japan has not addressed the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression\u2019s concerns about the government\u2019s threats of travel or access restrictions (\u201caccess journalism\u201d tactics) to intimidate and censor journalists who challenge government actions. For example, the government has used the Passport Act, which allows it to revoke the passports of citizens who have been denied entry to another country, to prevent Japanese war correspondents including Jumpei Yasuda from traveling overseas.[5]<\/a> Such passport denials restrict journalists\u2019 freedom to travel and report on international conflicts, destroying their ability to exercise their right to seek, receive, and impart information regardless of frontiers. The government\u2019s actions have had a chilling effect on Japanese journalists reporting on politically sensitive international issues such as ongoing conflicts, limiting people\u2019s access to important information.<\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 d. Abuse of the Broadcast Act<\/p>\n Broadcast journalism is especially vulnerable to government intimidation and censorship. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) has falsely claimed that it can revoke broadcast licenses of broadcasters based on the content of their reporting (e.g., for reporting it deems not \u201cpolitically balanced\u201d) under Article 4 of the Broadcast Act, although this interpretation is unconstitutional and denied by mainstream legal opinion.[6]<\/a> Nevertheless, the threat of license revocation, even if illegal or ultra vires<\/em>, gives broadcast journalists a significant incentive to self-censor. In 2018, NHK, Japan\u2019s public media service, pulled a story critical of how the government sold a publicly-owned insurance company after government officials objected to the story.[7]<\/a> In 2019, NHK journalists gave interviews where they expressed intense pressure to self-censor in order to avoid publishing news that may trigger retaliatory action from the government.[8]<\/a> MIC\u2019s false claim of authority to revoke broadcast licenses, combined with recent laws and policies restricting journalists\u2019 ability to report freely, reveal a worrying trend towards censoring and possibly punishing criticism of the state. The government must amend Article 4 to remove any ambiguity about the government\u2019s inability to arbitrarily revoke broadcasting licenses based on content, and it should establish an independent body to regulate and provide oversight over decisions affecting broadcasters.<\/p>\n In 2017, the Diet passed a counterterrorism conspiracy law that criminalizes 277 often vague or ambiguously defined acts, such as \u201cplanning\u201d and \u201cpreparatory acts\u201d, some of which, as the Special Rapporteur for Privacy at the time described, \u201cappear totally unrelated with the scope of organized crime and terrorism.\u201d[9]<\/a> For example, the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations noted that in deliberations in the Diet on the law, \u201cit was explained that organized crime groups are not limited to groups which routinely repeat crimes\u201d and that \u201cthe Law is applicable to acts regarding preparation even if they are daily activities without any specific danger as compared with preparatory acts under crimes of preparation.\u201d[10]<\/a> The Special Rapporteur for Privacy also expressed his concern that the law will affect the rights to privacy and expression as well as allow the government to arbitrarily target NGOs for their legitimate activities.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n In 2020, then-Prime Minister Suga made the unprecedented decision to refuse six scientists\u2019 appointments to the Science Council of Japan (SCJ). Prime Minister Suga offered no explanation for denying these six candidates out of SCJ\u2019s 105 recommended appointments, but the six scientists have all voiced opposition to the government\u2019s security and criminal justice policies in the past.[12]<\/a> Refusing appointments to scientists based on policy objections seriously undermines academics\u2019 rights to academic freedom and the right to education, as the decision has significantly deteriorated the government\u2019s relationship to SCJ.[13]<\/a> Rather than rectify this relationship and reaffirm Japan\u2019s commitment to academic freedom, the current administration of Prime Minister Kishida is upholding the previous administration\u2019s decision.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n In 2019, the Aichi prefectural government shut down an exhibition at the Aichi Triennale containing works critical of Japan\u2019s imperial past, including a statue depicting a Korean comfort woman, citing security concerns due to the controversial nature of the works.[15]<\/a> Takashi Kawamura, the mayor of Nagoya, openly called for the censorship of the exhibition, saying it \u201ctramples on the feelings of Japanese citizens.\u201d[16]<\/a> The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology subsequently withdrew its previously-approved subsidy for the Triennale.[17]<\/a> Later art exhibitions faced similar harassment.[18]<\/a><\/p>\n HRN calls on the government of Japan to:<\/p>\n III. The Government\u2019s Failures to Take Sufficient Measures to End, Prevent, and Prohibit Hate Speech (Article 20)<\/strong><\/p>\n Xenophobic and racist speech online has been linked to a recent increase in hate crimes against ethnic Koreans in Japan.[19]<\/a> However, the government has not adopted new legislation or reforms its 2016 Hate Speech Act to address the proliferation of hate speech, particularly online.[20]<\/a> The government has not amended the national 2016 Act to explicitly prohibit hate speech, to address the role of the internet in hate speech, nor to criminalize serious forms of hate speech, even though several municipalities have asked for more guidance on what constitutes hate speech under the Act or passed explicit ordinances of their own.[21]<\/a> Full enjoyment of protection from hate speech is also undermined by the fact that the government still has not withdrawn its reservation to ICERD Article 4.[22]<\/a><\/p>\n HRN calls on the government of Japan to:<\/p>\n IV. Arbitrary Detention in Immigration Detention Facilities and Ill-Treatment in their Facilities (Articles 2, 7, 9, 10, 14, 26)<\/strong>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA) authorizes the Immigration Bureau to unilaterally issue detention orders for foreign nationals who do not have a valid visa and vests the power to grant provisional release with Immigration Services Agency (ISA) officials.[23]<\/a> In practice, the ISA\u2019s policies subject immigrants to arbitrary and indefinite detentions without a proper court order.[24]<\/a> Although Japan has made efforts to reduce the number of detained individuals due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic,[25]<\/a> the ISA continues to make detention decisions arbitrarily, and it subjects those detained to unlawful punishment including solitary confinement[26]<\/a> and to denial of medical treatment, resulting in the death of several detained immigrants.[27]<\/a><\/p>\n The unilateral authority of the ISA in immigration detention decisions subjects immigrants to arbitrary detention. The UNHRC has expressed that for detentions to not be arbitrary, they must be necessary and reasonable in all circumstances, adding that the mandatory and non-reviewable detention of refugees and asylum seekers would be arbitrary.[28]<\/a><\/p>\n Under the ICRRA, immigration officials may detain immigrants without valid visas on the belief that they will abscond, without proffering any evidence supporting that belief.[29]<\/a> The ISA, which also oversees visa issuances, has detained individuals even when they fit the criteria for a certain type of visa, such as immigrants married to Japanese citizens.[30]<\/a> Although the ISA vowed last year to end its policy of mandatory detention for undocumented immigrants after Sri Lankan Wishma Sandamali died at a detention facility due to a lack of medical care, the National Diet has not passed any legislation to prohibit mandatory detention or otherwise limit the ISA\u2019s broad discretion over detention policy.[31]<\/a><\/p>\n Despite the growing international consensus that indefinite detention violates immigrants\u2019 rights[32]<\/a> and a September 2020 opinion from the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention that Japan\u2019s indefinite detentions of a Turkish and an Iranian asylum seeker violated the UDHR and ICCPR,[33]<\/a> neither Japanese law nor ISA policy set limits on the length of detention. Many immigrants, including asylum seekers, have been in detention for years without explanation as to why the ISA deems their detention necessary.[34]<\/a> Under the ICRRA, the ISA has the sole authority to grant provisional releases, which have dramatically increased in recent years due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.[35]<\/a> While the ISA frames these releases as a temporary public health measure to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the policy change underscores that the Bureau has less restrictive means of monitoring undocumented immigrants, which can and should be used in lieu of detention wherever possible.<\/p>\n ICRRA does not require judicial review or approval for immigrant detention. Although ICRRA nominally allows immigrants to appeal the ISA\u2019s decisions to detain them, judicial review is limited to whether the agency abused its discretion.[36]<\/a><\/p>\n The waiting time inherent in the judicial process also deprives immigrants of meaningful independent review of their detention, and creates opportunities for the ISA to avoid judicial oversight. The ISA previously deported two Sri Lankan men one day after informing them that their applications for refugee status were rejected, conduct that a Tokyo High Court held violated the Sri Lankans\u2019 right to a fair trial.[37]<\/a> Even when a court rules in a refugee status applicant\u2019s favor, the ISA has on at least one occasion reaffirmed its rejection of the application and kept the applicant in detention.[38]<\/a> The ISA\u2019s conduct in these cases illustrate the inefficacy of judicial review as a means of relief for detained immigrants, and highlight the arbitrariness and illegality of the ISA\u2019s detention policies.<\/p>\n Multiple immigrants have died in Japan\u2019s detention facilities after immigration officials denied their repeated requests for medical care.[39]<\/a> At least five others have taken their own lives, usually following years of indefinite detention.[40]<\/a> Recent data suggests that immigration officials are increasingly subjecting detained immigrants to physical force and solitary confinement, often for periods of a month or longer.[41]<\/a><\/p>\n In 2021, the ISA acknowledged wrongdoing in the death of Wishma Sandamali, and has pledged to take efforts to prevent the denial of medical treatment to detained immigrants going forward.[42]<\/a> However, as of the time of this submission, a majority of detention facilities still do not have a full-time doctor on-site.[43]<\/a><\/p>\n Under the ICRRA, the ISA retains broad discretion in setting and enforcing immigration policy. Although the ISA is considering establishing a \u201csubsidiary protection\u201d status to provide legal residency to individuals who do not qualify for refugee status under Japanese law but are escaping war\u2014keeping in mind Japan\u2019s unjustifiably narrow interpretation of the criteria for refugee status\u2014this protection is substantially less than international standards for humane refugee protection.<\/p>\n Furthermore, the Agency also supports legislative changes that would grant the ISA more power to deport immigrants, even those fearing persecution in their home countries, which may constitute a serious violation of the duty of non-refoulement if passed.[44]<\/a> The majority party, the Liberal Democratic Party, withdrew a proposal for such legislation in 2021 following widespread public opposition.[45]<\/a><\/p>\n The opposition parties have proposed legislation to set up an independent expert committee to evaluate refugee applications, require an individual assessment in order to detain an immigrant, and limit the detention period to six months.[46]<\/a> Despite efforts to reform Japan\u2019s immigration system, the ICRRA has not been amended since 2008.[47]<\/a><\/p>\n HRN calls on the government of Japan to:<\/p>\n V. Business and Human Rights Issues <\/strong>(Articles 2, 7, 8, 26)<\/strong><\/p>\n In 1993, the Japanese government launched the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) to offer foreign interns work opportunities and professional development in Japanese companies. However, migrant workers entering Japan under the program have suffered labor and human rights abuses which the government of Japan has failed to sufficiently address, and it must do more to ensure appropriate oversight of the program and to prevent and remedy human rights abuses.<\/p>\n Alleged violations under TITP include exploitation of workers, sexual harassment, disappearances, violence and death, confiscation of documents and passports, and forced labor.[48]<\/a> Migrants often pay up to $10,000 for job opportunities to the sending agencies in their home countries, and they are required by those agencies to commit to conditions that mandate forfeiture of thousands of dollars if they leave.[49]<\/a> Many interns are paid less than minimum wage. Interns have been particularly vulnerable to mistreatment and poor working conditions due to the pandemic.[50]<\/a><\/p>\n To date, the Japanese government has not prosecuted or convicted perpetrators of forced labor and other abuses within TITP despite numerous reports of labor trafficking and other offenses, despite repeated Committee recommendations to rectify labor standards violations.[51]<\/a> Between 2012 and 2017, 171 trainees have died while in the program; as of 2019, 9,052 foreign trainees have disappeared from their workplaces.[52]<\/a> Inconsistent with previous Committee recommendations to ensure the right to just and favorable work conditions, the program remains a source of widespread reports of sexual abuse, labor-related deaths, and dangerous working conditions that amount to forced labor.[53]<\/a><\/p>\n In 2017, the Japanese government enacted the Technical Intern Training Act (TITA) and established the Organization for Technical Intern Training (OTIT) to ameliorate and monitor interns\u2019 working conditions. However OTIT, staffed by 350 workers, is not equipped to address the volume of reported labor rights violations, especially as the program continues to grow to as many as 400,000 interns.[54]<\/a><\/p>\n Despite recent development of a National Action Plan (NAP) for implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), the government has not established measures requiring Japanese companies to conduct effective human rights due diligence within their supply chains, and companies widely continue to fail to conduct sufficient due diligence absent any requirement.[55]<\/a> A survey of major companies by MOFA and METI in 2021 demonstrates the inadequacy of companies\u2019 due diligence programs compared to international standards.[56]<\/a> The government should follow up with legislation requiring companies to conduct effective due diligence and remediation of violations consistent with international standards. The absence of an NHRI has compounded the problem, and the government has also failed to support companies\u2019 due diligence for heightened risk in conflict areas.[57]<\/a><\/p>\n HRN recommends that the Japanese government should:<\/p>\n VI. Gender Based Discrimination and <\/strong>Violence (Articles 7, 17)<\/strong><\/p>\n 21. Background<\/p>\n The government has failed to take sufficient measures to prevent violence against women and girls. Over 95% of sexual violence incidents in Japan are not reported to police and only 0.7% of sexual violence victims surveyed report that their attackers faced criminal punishment.[58]<\/a> Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, domestic violence has hit record-high levels despite laws against spousal violence.[59]<\/a><\/p>\n Married couples are legally required to use the same surname, and the Supreme Court recently upheld the rule\u2019s constitutionality.[60]<\/a> However, this contravenes established international human rights jurisprudence that a person\u2019s chosen name is an important element of the right to privacy.[61]<\/a> Despite this and the shift of public opinion against it, the government has failed to end the rule.[62]<\/a>Abortion law<\/p>\n While abortions are legal under certain conditions in Japan, outside a few exceptions, they require the consent of the husband, creating an unjustified burden on women inconsistent with sexual and reproductive rights and the right to bodily autonomy which includes, as reiterated in the 2021 Nairobi Summit on ICPD25 Follow-up Report, women\u2019s right to make their own choices regarding abortion services.[63]<\/a><\/p>\n One out of 13 Japanese women report being forced to engage in sexual intercourse.[64]<\/a> The legislative developments since Japan\u2019s last reporting cycle (including sexual assault against males in the definition of \u201cforced sexual intercourse\u201d and raising the minimum penalty to five years\u2019 imprisonment in 2017)[65]<\/a> were greatly insufficient to address sexual violence in Japan and the government\u2019s failure to meet international standards for prevention through legislation.[66]<\/a> In 2019, for example, there were four shocking acquittals for sex crimes due to the woman victim not resisting (due to intoxication, incest, etc.) despite lack of consent being proven.[67]<\/a> The current law retains the requirements of \u201cviolence or threat\u201d and \u201cinability to resist\u201d that exclude assault cases involving nonresistance. Also, the age of consent is 13, which the CRC Committee described as \u201cvery low\u201d and recommended states to review for reform.[68]<\/a> The definition of forced sexual intercourse also excludes sexual violence among some sexual minorities, due to its requirement of the involvement of male genitalia.[69]<\/a> Moreover, the law does not explicitly address marital rape nor presume non-consent where the perpetrator exploits a power-relation (such as incest, work superiors, doctors, teachers, etc.).<\/p>\n Among Japanese women, 46% report experiencing some form of online harassment and 32% of women report specifically experiencing sexual harassment on the internet and social media.[70]<\/a> In 2019, the Labor Ministry performed 7,323 workplace harassment consultations.[71]<\/a> Despite voting to pass the ILO Convention on Violence and Harassment, the government has not made the necessary legislative developments, such as explicitly banning sexual harassment, to ratify the Convention.[72]<\/a> Newly introduced legislation on workplace harassment is non-enforceable and does not cover freelancers or politicians, despite 60% of female municipal councilors having reported facing sexual harassment.[73]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n HRN recommends that the Japanese government should:<\/p>\n VII. Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity (SOGI) and Expression (ARTICLES 2, 7, 17, 23 AND 26)<\/strong><\/p>\n Japan\u2019s government has failed to pass legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, despite widespread national support and UN recommendations to do so before the Tokyo 2020 Olympics.[74]<\/a> The government has failed to even prevent or censure its own officials from using homophobic and transphobic discourse against LGBT individuals. Several MPs of the ruling party have publicly discriminated against LGBT persons.[75]<\/a> For example during a debate in 2021 on a bill to protect LGBT rights, one lawmaker described LGBT people as \u201cmorally unacceptable,\u201d while MP Kazuo Yana argued that sexual minorities are \u201cresisting the preservation of the species that occurs naturally in biological terms.\u201d[76]<\/a> Instead of\u00a0 punishing such behaviour, the Kishida administration appointed one such MP, Mio Sugita, as vice minister for Internal Affairs and Communications.[77]<\/a><\/p>\n According to the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, widespread prejudice against LGBT individuals are other social factors of intolerance cause a high percentage of sexual minorities to contemplate suicide.[78]<\/a> Without national legislation to explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, government action to protect sexual minorities from violence, hate speech, unfair treatment, or workplace and school harassment, is significantly limited. These legislative gaps and lack of political will further enable widespread discrimination and stigma against LGBT people.<\/p>\n The government has also failed to legislate same-sex marriages despite the district courts of Sapporo and Osaka declaring non-recognition of equal same-sex marriages unconstitutional under the guarantees of equality and freedom of marriage found in Article 24.[79]<\/a> The decisions called on the Diet to pass legislation remedying the inequality; however, the government has continued to fail to pass such legislation.<\/p>\n In justifying its delay in recognizing same-sex marriages, the government stated in its reply to the Committee that \u201c[t]he question of whether or not same-sex marriage or systems equivalent to that should be introduced is an issue related to the nature of families in Japan. Therefore, careful consideration is required in light of national-level debates made thus far.\u201d[80]<\/a> However, debates about the nature of families in Japan do not justify the deprivation of the rights to family life and respect for privacy guaranteed to LGBT individuals by the Covenant, nor any delays in respecting these rights.<\/p>\n Japan\u2018s Gender Identity Disorder Special Cases Act (GID Special Cases Act) contains discriminatory provisions that require transgender people to undergo invasive and unnecessary medical procedures, such as sterilization and compulsive gender confirmation surgery, and be unmarried to have their gender legally recognized.[81]<\/a> It also pathologizes gender identity as a mental disorder, providing a legal basis for their further marginalization and discrimination.<\/p>\n The mandatory sterilization and gender confirmation surgery required of transgender people under the Act amounts to coerced medical intervention that subjects transgender individuals to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and it denies transgender individuals the right to privacy and family life. Retaining the label of \u201cGender Identity Disorder\u201d despite the World Health Assembly\u2019s recent removal of GID from the International Classification of Diseases further classifies transgender individuals\u2019 experience as an illness, contradicting international standards and medical best practices.[82]<\/a> The Japanese government must revise the GID Special Cases Act to ensure transgender people\u2019s rights to equal recognition before the law without undermining their dignity.<\/p>\n HRN recommends that the Japanese government should:<\/p>\n VIII. Children\u2019s Rights<\/strong> (Articles 2, 7, 24)<\/strong><\/p>\n Child pornographic material continues to be widely produced and disseminated in Japan. A recent HRN investigation revealed the narrow definition of child pornography allows sexual exploitation of minors, and gaps in enforcement also perpetuate the wide availability of child pornography.[83]<\/a><\/p>\n Many schools require students with hair that is not naturally black and straight to submit documentation corroborating their natural hair color and texture.[84]<\/a> Last year, an Osaka court held that high schools could force students to dye their hair black if suspected of lying about their natural hair color.[85]<\/a> Such policies discriminate students of mixed or non-Japanese descent.<\/p>\n HRN recommends that the Japanese government should:<\/p>\n IX. The Death Penalty (Article 6) <\/strong><\/p>\n 34. Background and the absence of action against the death penalty<\/p>\n There are currently 107 people on death row at the time of this writing, and the Japanese government has taken no steps towards eliminating the death penalty.[86]<\/a> After a two-year moratorium on executions, the current Kishida administration has doubled down on its support for the death penalty by resuming executions and executing three people on death row in December 2021.[87]<\/a> One of the inmates, Mitsunori Onogawa, had filed a request for a retrial and, at the time of his execution, the request decision was still pending.[88]<\/a><\/p>\n While more than 70% of the world\u2019s countries have abolished the death penalty in law or practice,[89]<\/a> the Japanese government has made no effort to educate the public on international trends and norms for abolition. Also, while the government uses public support for capital punishment as justification for its policy to maintain the death penalty\u2014in its reply to the Committee it stated that it \u201cis of the view that it is not appropriate to abolish the death penalty\u201d based on public opinion in favor of the death penalty[90]<\/a>\u2014 this stance is disingenuous as the government has made no effort to educate the public on international trends and norms of death penalty abolition, nor has it made any efforts at further review of the issue.<\/p>\n In 2016 the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations adopted a declaration calling for reform of the criminal penal system given the possibility of wrongful convictions, and the abolition of the death penalty in concert with international trends against capital punishment.[91]<\/a><\/p>\n Inmates sentenced to death are only notified of their execution on the date of execution itself, which the government justified in its reply to the Committee by stating that it was \u201cout of consideration that an advance notice before the day of the execution would disturb the inmate\u2019s peace of mind and might cause further suffering.\u201d However, the practice is a source of serious, constant, and long-term anguish for inmates and their families, constituting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment toward the inmates and their families as well as raising serious due process concerns.<\/p>\n The long-standing Ministry of Justice policy notifies inmates of their executions mere hours before the executions are scheduled to occur, despite the fact that executions are often scheduled within five days of the Justice Minister\u2019s decision.[92]<\/a> A lawsuit by death row inmates concerning the notification policy is currently pending, citing the imposition of excessive psychological distress and mental suffering experienced by inmates from living in uncertainty until the last day of their lives, as well as the impact on their families.[93]<\/a><\/p>\n The Committee Against Torture categorizes same-day executions as a clear human rights violation, causing needless psychological suffering through unnecessary secrecy and uncertainty surrounding executions. The last-minute notification policy, not stipulated by law, makes filing objections to the execution practically impossible, and raises serious due process concerns under Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution, which guarantees that criminal penalties will not be imposed unless an established legal procedure has been followed.[94]<\/a><\/p>\n Further, detention conditions of people sentenced to death are extremely restrictive and inmates are systematically placed in solitary confinement to the serious detriment of their physical and mental health over many years.[95]<\/a> More than 25% of people sentenced to death are over the age of 70, and two individuals on death row have been incarcerated for over 40 years.[96]<\/a><\/p>\n HRN recommends that the Japanese government should:<\/p>\n X. Rights of People Affected by the Fukushima Disaster (Articles 6, <\/strong>17, <\/strong>19, 23)<\/strong><\/p>\n 37. More than 40,000 people remain displaced due to the Fukushima nuclear disaster and are subsisting without sources of livelihood, compensation, or housing assistance from the government.[97]<\/a> Affected people continue to be forced to live in unsafe areas, as the government pursues decontamination policies prioritizing speed and cost-effectiveness over the safety of those living in radiation hotspots. [98]<\/a> Prolonged evacuation has also led to a deterioration in standards of living and higher levels of disaster-related deaths by physical and mental breakdown, even more than 10 years after the disaster.[99]<\/a> This situation threatens affected people\u2019s right to life, their enjoyment of a safe home life guaranteed by their right to privacy, and their right to family life, undermined by prolonged evacuation and uncertain housing situations which have separated families for long periods. Although their status falls into the category of IDPs, the government has failed to conduct in depth investigations of the status of evacuees, including their rights to life, family rights, housing rights and their mental and physical health conditions, nor has it addressed their basic needs or ensured their rights under the Covenant.<\/p>\n 38. Furthermore, the government has not conducted credible environmental impact assessments for disaster-related actions or proposals, such as decontamination methods and the discharge of ALPS treated water into the ocean, which violates the public\u2019s right to access important and accurate information on issues of public concern, especially involving health risks.[100]<\/a><\/p>\n HRN recommends that the Japanese government should:<\/p>\n __________<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Mina Pollmann, \u201cJapan\u2019s Troubling State Secrets Law Takes Effect\u201d, Diplomat, 18 Dec. 2014, https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2014\/12\/japans-troubling-state-secrets-law-takes-effect\/<\/a><\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Ken Aoshima and Mami Yamada, \u201cGov’t’s state secrecy law still vague, rapped 5 years after enactment\u201d, Mainichi, 6 Dec. 2018, https:\/\/mainichi.jp\/english\/articles\/20181206\/p2a\/00m\/0na\/017000c<\/a><\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Mainichi, “Upper house board overseeing special secrets law reports no progress on verification”, 8 June 2017, https:\/\/mainichi.jp\/english\/articles\/20170608\/p2a\/00m\/0na\/006000c<\/a><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Library of Congress, \u201cJapan: Major Land-Use Regulation Act Enacted\u201d, Global Legal Monitor, https:\/\/www.loc.gov\/item\/global-legal-monitor\/2021-09-08\/japan-major-land-use-regulation-act-enacted\/<\/a><\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Jiji Press, \u201cJapanese Journalist Yasuda Denied Passport Reissuance\u201d, 16 Jul. 2019, https:\/\/www.nippon.com\/en\/news\/yjj2019071601009\/japanese-journalist-yasuda-denied-passport-reissuance.html<\/a><\/p>\n [6]<\/a> David Kaye, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on [freedom of expression] on his mission to Japan”, A\/HRC\/35\/22\/Add.1, 29 May 2017, https:\/\/hrn.or.jp\/wpHN\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/05\/A_HRC_35_22_Add.1_AUV.pdf<\/a>, \u201cThe Broadcast Act (Act No. 132 of 1950) (Unofficial Translation)\u201d,\u00a0 https:\/\/www.soumu.go.jp\/main_sosiki\/joho_tsusin\/eng\/Resources\/laws\/pdf\/090204_5.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Akiko Asami, “Growing demand for independence and substantive self-regulation in Japan\u2019s public service media”, LSE, 2 Feb. 2021, https:\/\/blogs.lse.ac.uk\/medialse\/2021\/02\/02\/growing-demand-for-independence-and-substantive-self-regulation-in-japans-public-service-media\/<\/a><\/p>\n [8]<\/a> Japan Times, “Japan falls to 71st in world press freedom rankings”, 4 May 2022, https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2022\/05\/04\/national\/press-freedom-index-japan-fall\/<\/a>; Tomoyuki Isoyama, \u201cNHK and Japan Post, which one is closer to the \u2018gangsters\u2019?\u201d (in Japanese), 4 Oct. 2019, https:\/\/president.jp\/articles\/-\/30221<\/a><\/p>\n [9]<\/a> \u201cJapan passes controversial anti-terror conspiracy law:, BBC, 15 June 2017, https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-asia-40283730<\/a>; Joseph Cannataci, “Letter of the Special Rapportuer on the right to privacy to the government of Japan”, OHCHR, 18 May 2017, https:\/\/hrn.or.jp\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/06\/OL_JPN.pdf<\/a>; HRN, \u201cJapan: UN Special Rapporteur Expresses Concern over the Government\u2019s Conspiracy Bill\u201d, 1 Jun. 2017, https:\/\/hrn.or.jp\/eng\/news\/2017\/06\/01\/japan-conspiracy-bill\/<\/a><\/p>\n [10]<\/a> JFBA, “Report of JFBA Regarding the Seventh Periodic Report by the Government of Japan”, https:\/\/www.nichibenren.or.jp\/library\/pdf\/activity\/international\/library\/human_rights\/iccpr_7en.pdf<\/a>, at 13.<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> Cannataci, supra, note 9.<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Tomohiro Ikeda, Mirai Nagira and Ayumu Iwasaki, \u201cPM Suga refuses to appoint 6 scholars to Science Council of Japan in unprecedented move\u201d, Mainichi, 2 Oct. 2020, https:\/\/mainichi.jp\/english\/articles\/20201002\/p2a\/00m\/0na\/007000c<\/a><\/p>\n [13]<\/a> HRN, \u201cThe Refusal to Appoint Members of the Science Council of Japan is an Unacceptable Violation of International Human Rights Law\u201d, 6 Oct. 2020, https:\/\/hrn.or.jp\/eng\/news\/2020\/10\/06\/statement-scj-appointment-refusals\/<\/a><\/p>\n [14]<\/a> Keishi Nishimura and Rintaro Sakurai, “Let\u2019s talk, Kishida tells science council; but ban stands”, Asahi Shinbun , 14 Jan. 2022, https:\/\/www.asahi.com\/ajw\/articles\/14521859<\/a><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Tadasu Takahashi, “Freedom of Expression and the 2019 Aichi Triennale”, Tokyo Review, 8 May 2020, https:\/\/www.tokyoreview.net\/2020\/05\/aichi-triennale-2019-freedom-expression\/<\/a><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> NHK, \u201cTriennale Political Speech: A Constitutional Scholar\u2019s Thoughts\u201d (in Japanese), 4 Sept. 2019, https:\/\/www.nhk.or.jp\/politics\/articles\/statement\/22216.html<\/a><\/p>\n
\n<\/h2>\n
Submission by Human Rights Now to the UN Human Rights Committee in advance of the examination of the State Party report for Japan at the 136th Session<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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