

STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS & SANCTIONS IN MYANMAR

JULY 2026 REPORT

Summary. This report reviews the July 2026 developments relating to human rights in Myanmar.

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I. Coup, Crackdown on Protests and Civilian Resistance

In early July, heavy fighting broke out in Nabar Village in Sagaing Region, a strategic junction linking road and rail routes between the region and Kachin State, leaving around 800 vehicles stranded.¹ The regime then reportedly launched airstrikes on the trucks near the Taung Yin junction.² The airstrikes reportedly killed 16 people and injured 20 others.³

The Myanmar regime admitted on July 23 to abducting young men for conscription.⁴ Defense Minister General Tun Aung instructed regional administrations to work with immigration officials to compile conscription lists.⁵ According to the Myanmar Defense and Security Institute, roughly 70% of conscripts in military camps were recruited through threats, arrests or nighttime abductions.⁶ Forcible recruitment allegedly increased in major cities like Yangon and Mandalay, with locals reporting a spike in home arrests under the pretext of overnight guest registration checks, forced abductions and officials wearing plain clothes snatching people off the street.⁷

Myanmar's military has been accused of executing captured resistance fighters during raids on villages in Chauk Township, Magway Region, where approximately 20 People's Defense Force ("PDF") members were killed after being trapped in a regime counterattack near Taungtha village on July 10.⁸ Drone footage and pro-military social media posts suggest that some fighters were captured alive before being shot on a commander's orders, while the broader military operation—backed by air and drone strikes—has displaced thousands of civilians from surrounding villages since late June, leaving them in urgent need of humanitarian aid amid the monsoon season.⁹

Min Aung Hlaing submitted 43 proposed amendments to the military-drafted 2008 Constitution to the military-controlled Union Parliament, dividing them into two categories: those requiring both a 75% parliamentary supermajority and a national referendum (covering fundamental provisions such as presidential eligibility rules), and those needing only the parliamentary supermajority that the military and its proxy party can readily achieve.¹⁰ The amendments—drawn from negotiations with ethnic armed organizations and political parties that originally proposed over 200 changes—reportedly include extending eligibility restrictions that bar Aung San Suu Kyi from office to additional government positions, lengthening terms for the Constitutional Tribunal and Election Commission, and allowing states to draft their own constitutions, though notably omit ethnic parties' key demand for locally elected chief ministers.¹¹

Over the five years since Myanmar's 2021 coup, nearly 900 civilians—including internally displaced persons—have been killed by military forces in Karenni (Kayah) State, according to data collected by the Progressive Karenni People Force across the state's eight townships and adjacent Pekon Township in southern Shan State.¹² The conflict has produced over 1,600 clashes and 2,100 airstrikes, damaged thousands of structures including homes, schools, and medical facilities, and displaced approximately 250,000 people, while 80% of farmland around key areas lies fallow due to the fighting, creating a growing humanitarian crisis in Myanmar's smallest state despite resistance forces having seized and subsequently lost several towns during shifting battles with the regime.¹³

An estimated 150,000 villagers displaced by fighting in Pakokku District in Myanmar's Magway Region are facing urgent shortages of food, medicine, and shelter roughly a month into

their displacement, as regime forces and allied militias have intensified offensives to regain control of territories bordering Chin and Rakhine states.¹⁴ Humanitarian delivery is reportedly severely hampered by ongoing clashes, resource limitations, and the fledgling nature of the resistance-aligned Magway Federal Unit Government—which only formed in March 2026 and lacks key personnel—while the communities that previously hosted displaced populations are themselves being forced to flee.¹⁵ The UN estimates Magway is Myanmar’s third most affected region with 280,000 internally displaced persons as of June 2026.¹⁶

In Magway Region, the Myanmar army reportedly set fire to Pakanng (Baganng) village in Chauk Township, a settlement of ancient cultural heritage, according to the Magway Regional PDF.¹⁷ In Gantgaw District, two aircraft allegedly dropped more than 40 bombs on targets in Saw Township.¹⁸ Myanmar military forces also retreated in Saw Township, where nine soldiers were taken prisoner and a large quantity of weapons was confiscated in battles against People’s Defense Forces during July.¹⁹

In Kayin State two women were reportedly killed in a Myanmar military airstrike on the same day the ASEAN Special Envoy reiterated calls for the regime to halt violence under the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus.²⁰

In Mandalay Region, resistance forces conducted guerrilla and drone attacks on four Myanmar military stations in Natoegy Township.²¹ Earlier in the month, four Myanmar military soldiers were reportedly killed and weapons were confiscated in local battles in Mahlaing Township, Mandalay Region, and in Bago Region a Myanmar military column occupying a village in Gyobingauk Township allegedly prevented displaced residents from returning home.²²

Myanmar’s regime reportedly intensified military clearance operations in Tanintharyi Region’s Yebyu Township beginning in early July 2026 to secure the area around the long-delayed, Russian-backed Dawei Special Economic Zone, deploying more than 500 troops from infantry battalions based in Kalein Aung and Thayetchaung in two advancing columns through local villages.²³ The operation followed a June 22 visit by Deputy Commander-in-Chief Kyaw Swar Lin, who urged troops to “wipe out” the PDF along National Highway No. 8—which runs from Ye to Kawthaung—and secure the project.²⁴ Local media reported that regime troops forcibly displaced residents from at least seven Yebyu villages, looting property, burning homes, and abducting male villagers to serve as human shields and transport soldiers.²⁵ Three humanitarian aid workers, Ko Athar, Ko Leo, and Ko Myat Thu from the local group “The Ants,” along with an unidentified civilian were reportedly found dead and disfigured near the villages of Wazundaw and Akani after being taken hostage on July 9, along with roughly 30 other villagers from Kamauk Chaung, while evacuating and encountering an advancing regime column.²⁶ Their bodies were reportedly identifiable only by clothing and ID cards, prompting The Ants to temporarily suspend humanitarian operations.²⁷ First established in 2008 as a Myanmar-Thailand joint venture, the Dawei SEZ stalled repeatedly over funding shortfalls, local opposition and conflict following the 2021 coup, but the Myanmar military regime reopened it to Russian investment in early 2025 amid deepening bilateral ties, including a February 2025 memorandum of understanding and a subsequent agreement for a Russian state company to build a power plant at Dawei.²⁸

On July 22, Progressive Voice and eight civil society organizations launched a briefing paper, “Blocked Aid, Unbroken People: Resisting Junta’s Aid Weaponization,” recording that between February 2021 and December 2025 more than 6,500 airstrikes reportedly killed nearly 4,000 civilians and injured over 7,000 others, and that more than 121,000 civilian homes have been destroyed since the coup, with Sagaing alone now hosting more than 1.3 million internally displaced people.²⁹ On July 24, fifteen organizations, including the Democratic Party for a New Society, released a joint statement calling on the public to protest strongly against the Myanmar military’s alleged ongoing airstrikes on civilians.³⁰ Independent tallies recorded 274 verified civilian deaths and 579 verified civilian injuries from airstrikes between April 20 and July 19.³¹

More than 100,000 people have been killed in Myanmar’s civil war since a February 2021 military coup ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data monitoring group, making it Asia’s deadliest active conflict.³² The conflict has displaced more than 3.7 million people internally, left one in five facing acute food insecurity, and spread instability beyond Myanmar’s borders through refugee flows, drug production, and transnational criminal operations in ungoverned borderlands.³³

II. Political Developments

A. Rohingya Refugee Crisis

The UN’s International Organization for Migration and its refugee agency UNHCR issued a joint statement on July 16 that reported that “two boats carrying more than 500 people may have capsized off the coast of Myanmar in recent days.”³⁴ Preliminary information indicated that the two vessels in question departed from Rakhine State in late June.³⁵ Most of those onboard were members of the Rohingya minority, the statement said.³⁶ Some had reportedly traveled from the refugee camps in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar, where more than 1 million Rohingya refugees who have fled from Rakhine live in squalid conditions.³⁷ The statement said that one boat, believed to have been carrying around 250 people, lost contact shortly after departure.³⁸ A second boat, reportedly carrying some 280 people, is meanwhile believed to have sunk off Myanmar’s Ayeyarwady Region coast on July 8.³⁹ The UN agencies highlighted that the journeys “took place outside the regular sailing season, when maritime conditions are typically more hazardous.”⁴⁰ The statement cautioned that “if verified, this tragedy would add to the nearly 300 people reported to be missing or to have lost their lives in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal so far this year, including Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshi nationals.”⁴¹ The statement stressed that the latest reported tragedies “underscore the devastating impact of protracted conflict and displacement, as well as the continued lack of sustainable solutions for Rohingya communities.”⁴²

B. Corruption

Immigration officials in Mon State reportedly are continuing to demand large bribes for processing official documents, despite the Myanmar regime’s announcement that it would take action against corrupt employees in the Ministry of Immigration and Population.⁴³ According to residents, some immigration officials and brokers are working together to demand between 200,000 and one million kyats from applicants seeking to transfer names, add newborn children to household registration lists or amend household registration records.⁴⁴

Myanmar regime officials at security checkpoints, inspection teams and security personnel across Mon State are reportedly demanding excessive payments from the public allegedly under the pretext of maintaining security.⁴⁵ Mon State Hluttaw representative Thant Zaw said some checkpoints stopped vehicles and demanded money from travelers for matters unrelated to security inspections, increasing transportation costs and commodity prices.⁴⁶ He further stated that the payments generated no tax revenue for the state and instead benefited those operating the checkpoints, and called for the responsible officials to be prosecuted under the Anti-Corruption Law.⁴⁷

On July 17, *Justice For Myanmar* (“JFM”) reported that, in the months following the February 2021 coup, a Myanmar regime-linked network allegedly sought to sell 800 kilograms of gold, valued at approximately US\$48 million, through Thailand, Laos and Hong Kong.⁴⁸ JFM alleges that the attempted transaction was coordinated by Min Aung Hlaing’s daughter Khin Thiri Thet Mon and involved arms broker and family associate Tun Min Latt as an intermediary.⁴⁹ JFM said its findings are based on draft contracts, letters of intent and private messages, but it could not confirm whether any gold ultimately changed hands.⁵⁰

C. International Community / Sanctions

Following her June remarks discussing the Myanmar “junta’s abuses during a briefing for UN member states,” various Myanmar regime outlets, including the Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services website, published an open letter to the UN secretary-general criticizing UN Special Envoy for Myanmar Julie Bishop and “accused her of lacking integrity.”⁵¹

On July 8, the Myanmar regime published a second open letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, urging him to remove current Myanmar ambassador to the UN, Kyaw Moe Tun, and appoint its nominee as Myanmar’s permanent representative.⁵² In the letter, the Myanmar military regime claimed the new administration was eager to “enhance cooperation” at the upcoming UN General Assembly though most of the letter itself was “devoted to personal attacks on Kyaw Moe Tun and attempts to discredit the National Unity Government and People’s Defense Forces.”⁵³

On July 12, during informal meetings between Myanmar Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe and his ASEAN counterparts, the ASEAN foreign ministers pressed Tin Maung Swe for “concrete” progress on the Five-Point Consensus, which was formally rejected by the Myanmar parliament the week before.⁵⁴ Following these discussions, Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow gave a press briefing where he noted that the ASEAN bloc had “concrete expectations” around humanitarian assistance, violence reduction and the promotion of inclusive political dialogue in Myanmar.⁵⁵

Following the informal meetings between Myanmar and ASEAN foreign ministers, the National Unity Government Foreign Minister, Zin Mar Aung, “warned that ASEAN’s re-engagement with Myanmar runs the risk of legitimizing the military regime.”⁵⁶ In her statements, she “acknowledge[d] the fact that ASEAN needs to change its approach to enforce the [Five-Point Consensus]” but cautioned that any “new strategy must not confer recognition on

the junta.”⁵⁷ Various resistance groups, activists and other international observers, including JFM, also spoke out against the meetings between Myanmar and ASEAN, with some noting that “even agreeing to meet with the [Myanmar Foreign Minister] was probably a mistake as it risks legitimizing a government that seized power illegally and continues a brutal military campaign against its own people.”⁵⁸

III. Civil and Political Rights

A. Freedom of Speech, Assembly and Association

Ma Moe San Suu Kyi, a youth leader of the National League for Democracy (“NLD”) and daughter of former Rakhine State Chief Minister Nyi Pu, was sentenced on July 6 to an additional five years in prison by the military regime.⁵⁹ According to a report by *Development Media Group*, the NLD leader was originally sentenced to six years in prison following the 2021 military coup, for alleged violations of Section 505(a) of the Penal Code and Section 17(1) of the Unlawful Associations Act.⁶⁰ The latest conviction, under Section 52(a) of the Counterterrorism Law, increases her total prison sentence to eleven years.⁶¹

According to monitoring data released by Athan on July 13, the Myanmar military arrested at least 49 people in June for taking part in a nationwide solidarity campaign marking Aung San Suu Kyi’s 81st birthday.⁶² To mark the detained former leader’s birthday in June, citizens inside Myanmar and the diaspora took part in the Rose Movement: Roses of Hope campaign.⁶³ Authorities responded to the Rose Movement with allegedly arbitrary arrests, physical assaults and rigorous stop-and-search inspections targeting people who wore roses, sold them, or shared photos of their participation online.⁶⁴ Athan’s data indicates that the majority of those detained were youths and students, with Monywa Township, in Sagaing Region, recording the highest number of arrests.⁶⁵ At least one of the 49 is being prosecuted under Section 505(a) of the Penal Code, a provision frequently used against government critics.⁶⁶

The *Democratic Voice of Burma* reported on July 30 that eight pro-democracy student activists were sentenced to thirty years in prison under the Election Protection Law and seven years in prison under the Counter-Terrorism Law.⁶⁷ One of the activists, Htet Myat Aung, had been arrested for protesting against the regime’s 2025-26 elections in Mandalay’s Chanmyathazi Township on December 3rd, 2025.⁶⁸

On July 5, approximately 30 political prisoners returning from an officially sanctioned football match inside Yangon’s Insein Prison were reportedly violently beaten by prison officials.⁶⁹ The Political Prisoners Network of Myanmar confirmed that the “inhumane treatment” resulted in severe trauma to the prisoners’ faces and heads.⁷⁰ Prison commander Zaw Lin Aung and supervisor Aung Ko Oo were identified as responsible for torture at Insein.⁷¹

On July 19, thirty-one political prisoners, including 15 women, were reportedly beaten and placed in solitary confinement at Tharyarwaddy Prison in Bago Region for commemorating the holiday, Martyrs’ Day.⁷² The 15 women were reportedly removed from group cells and placed in solitary confinement for wearing black ribbons.⁷³ The 16 male political prisoners were reportedly beaten and then placed in solitary confinement for saluting fallen heroes.⁷⁴

B. Freedom of the Press and Censorship

Myanmar Now reports that since April, the regime has continued to restrict independent media.⁷⁵ The authorities reportedly continue to block social media and news websites using firewalls.⁷⁶ In military-controlled regions, citizens can only access Facebook and other media platforms through VPNs, which are also officially banned.⁷⁷ At least eighteen Myanmar journalists remain in prison, including *Myanmar Now* photojournalist Sai Zaw Thaike.⁷⁸ In addition, since April, the regime has banned three independent media outlets, bringing the total number of banned outlets to twenty-three.⁷⁹ According to *Myanmar Now*, “[t]he military may now wield power through a civilian presidency, but for those living under it, not much has changed: The system beneath the new title feels much the same as before.”⁸⁰

On July 17, a coalition of civil society organizations sent an open letter to SpaceX, urging it to narrowly focus Starlink service shutdowns instead of imposing blanket shutdowns in Myanmar.⁸¹ SpaceX recently restricted Starlink access along the borders, as well as in unrelated conflict zones, including Sagaing, Magway, and Rakhine State.⁸² The shutdowns are reportedly connected to a regime crackdown on telecom scam syndicates, which have proliferated in Myanmar’s border regions.⁸³ Starlink provides a critical communications lifeline for civilians, because the military has been conducting widespread internet blackouts since the 2021 coup, particularly in conflict zones.⁸⁴ The letter highlighted Starlink’s role in supporting relief operations, emergency medical services, airstrike warning networks, schools, and independent media reporting.⁸⁵

IV. Economic Development

A. Economic Development—Legal Framework, Foreign Investment

India and Myanmar are deepening rare earths cooperation as New Delhi seeks alternative supplies of a strategic resource tightly controlled by China.⁸⁶ Speaking at a mining forum in Mandalay, India’s Ambassador to Myanmar Abhay Thakur said bilateral mining cooperation has gained “significant momentum” over the past two years, including Indian rare earths and critical minerals delegations to Myanmar in December 2024 and February 2026 and high-level discussions during Min Aung Hlaing’s May-June 2026 visit to India.⁸⁷ Thakur said India’s need for critical minerals and Myanmar’s potential benefits from sustainable mining create “win-win” short- and long-term opportunities.⁸⁸ Nearly half of the world’s heavy rare earths are extracted in Myanmar’s Kachin State and shipped to China for processing into magnets used in electric vehicles and wind turbines.⁸⁹ *Reuters* reports that India sought rare earth samples through the Kachin Independence Army (“KIA”), which controls Myanmar’s main mining hubs near the Chinese border, and that state-owned IREL and private firm Midwest Advanced Materials were involved in discussions on collecting and transporting samples.⁹⁰ Indian firms attending the Mandalay forum included IREL, NTPC Mining, Himadri Specialty, Oceanic Sands, PrNd Metal & Magnets, and Jai Puri Holdings.⁹¹

Min Aung Hlaing called on Japanese companies to expand investment and trade in Myanmar at a Yangon business event jointly organized by the Myanmar regime and a Japanese nongovernmental organization and featured in state media.⁹² Japan has not recognized the Myanmar military that seized power in 2021 or the current administration, and analysts said Min

Aung Hlaing’s in-person attendance underscored his effort to rebuild ties with Japan and ease Myanmar’s international isolation.⁹³ In his speech, he noted Japan’s past multibillion-dollar investments in Myanmar and said Japanese technology and capital, combined with Myanmar’s natural resources and labor force, could benefit both sides.⁹⁴

Egg prices in Myanmar have surged to a record 700 kyats each—nearly five times pre-coup levels—as the military regime’s import restrictions on soybean meal, veterinary medicines, and other poultry supplies have reportedly crippled domestic production, causing fungal infections, mass chicken culls, and an 80% drop in laying rates.⁹⁵ Although the Myanmar regime imposed a 550 kyats price ceiling in Yangon, industry members say the cap is unsustainable given that farm-gate production costs already reach 440 kyats per egg, and they warn that without prompt access to imported feed, vaccines, and replacement stock it will take at least four to five months to restore output—meaning prices are likely to keep climbing despite Commerce Minister Tun Ohn’s pledge to ease restrictions.⁹⁶

Myanmar’s military regime is reportedly intensifying efforts to funnel hard currency from the country’s millions of expatriate workers through its official banking system—at an artificially low exchange rate of 1,200 kyats per dollar versus the market rate of roughly 4,500—requiring migrant workers to repatriate 25% of their earnings and threatening those who refuse with a three-year overseas work ban.⁹⁷ At a July 8 seminar in Naypyitaw, Labor Minister Khin Maung Soe pressed overseas employment agencies to guarantee compliance, with agencies now facing fines of up to double the shortfall if their clients fail to remit, while workers and advocacy groups condemn the policy as exploitative, arguing that the regime provides no employment support yet diverts remittances to military spending rather than public welfare.⁹⁸

Min Aung Hlaing has signaled full strategic alignment with Beijing by signing memoranda of understanding on all four of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Global Initiatives—the Global Security Initiative (“GSI”), Global Development Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative, and Global Governance Initiative—making Myanmar the only country to commit to the entire framework.⁹⁹ Experts say the move cements China’s role as the regime’s indispensable patron—politically, financially, and militarily—in exchange for accelerated Belt and Road projects, enhanced border security, and protection of Chinese personnel, while the GSI in particular paves the way for Chinese private security firms to operate across Myanmar and provides the junta a sovereignty-based shield against international sanctions and accountability for post-coup atrocities.¹⁰⁰

B. Economic Development—Infrastructure, Major Projects

Myanmar regime is pushing to revive the long-suspended, China-backed Myitsone Dam in Kachin State, with President’s Office spokeswoman Khaing Khaing Soe confirming that the project’s resumption was discussed during Min Aung Hlaing’s recent trip to Beijing and that he has instructed officials to seek public consent to proceed.¹⁰¹ The dam, located at the confluence of the Mali and N’Mai rivers near Myitkyina, was originally suspended in 2011 under President Thein Sein following public protests over mass displacement, seismic risks, environmental destruction, cultural significance to the Kachin people, and plans to export 90% of its proposed 6,000-MW output to China.¹⁰² Min Aung Hlaing has since repeatedly blamed “internal and external agitators” for blocking the project.¹⁰³ The push to revive the dam gained urgency after the regime suffered

heavy battlefield defeats in Operation 1027 in northern Shan State, driving it toward deeper reliance on China.¹⁰⁴ Critics say that the dam will not resolve the country's immediate power crisis, which has produced worsening blackouts since the 2021 coup, and note that the revised plan—now scaled down to 5,600 MW as part of a broader scheme of seven dams along the two rivers—still lacks disclosed details on the contract, ownership, or operational framework, with civil society groups and the KIA continuing to reject the project outright over fears of irreversible damage to lives, homes, and the environment.¹⁰⁵

Naing Tun Lin, owner of NTL Construction, the firm that built Mandalay's Sky Villa condominium, has been sentenced to five years in prison with hard labor for causing death by negligence after the building collapsed during a devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake in March of last year, according to *Eleven Media* and a person familiar with the case.¹⁰⁶ The Sky Villa site was the deadliest single location in the disaster, with 206 people killed out of a nationwide death toll of at least 2,700.¹⁰⁷

Min Aung Hlaing pledged to complete both the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project within his five-year presidential term, alongside pushing forward the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor ("CMEC"), despite ongoing conflict along the routes.¹⁰⁸ At a coordination meeting, he directed ministers to prepare for construction once security is secured, though clashes continue on multiple fronts: the regime's claimed recapture of the Monywa-Tamu road section toward the Indian border is disputed by resistance forces, who say fighting persists and the military lacks full control, while intensifying clashes with the Karen National Union ("KNU") near Myawaddy threaten the highway's eastern section near Thailand.¹⁰⁹ The Kaladan project, intended to connect India's northeast to the Bay of Bengal via Rakhine and Chin States, faces similar obstacles since the Arakan Army ("AA") controls most of Rakhine and Paletwa in Chin State, including areas critical to the project, and is now advancing into Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, where China's CMEC infrastructure—including the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and associated road and rail links to Yunnan—is based.¹¹⁰ Meanwhile, residents in northern Shan State's Lashio report no sign of trade or construction resuming, as the area remains surrounded by Kokang rebel forces.¹¹¹

Min Aung Hlaing inaugurated the newly upgraded Anisakhan Airport in Pyin Oo Lwin on July 11, calling it a gateway to the nearby Yadanabon Cyber City, a "Silicon Valley" technology hub that his son, Aung Pyae Sone, oversees, despite holding no official regime position.¹¹² The colonial-era airfield, revived by the Myanmar military in 2023, now features a new steel terminal, expanded apron and control tower capable of handling 100,000 passengers annually.¹¹³ Critics allege that the Yadanabon Cyber City project has led to forced evictions and enriched military elites profiting from soaring local land prices.¹¹⁴ The Yadanabon Cyber City Supervisory Committee has also invited investors to submit development proposals for the 5.6-square-kilometer site by August 25, which is planned to include luxury housing, industrial and agricultural zones with AI centers and electronics factories, and educational, healthcare and recreational facilities.¹¹⁵

According to Energy Minister Ko Ko Lwin, Phase 1 of the Thanlyin refinery, which is designed to process 500,000 tons of crude oil annually, is scheduled to begin operations in September.¹¹⁶ The refinery was built in 1925 when Myanmar was under British colonial rule.¹¹⁷ It

ceased operations in 2017 under the civilian administration that governed Myanmar prior to Min Aung Hlaing's 2021 coup, due to limited crude supply and the poor quality of the facility's output.¹¹⁸ After seizing power, the military launched construction of a modular refinery with a capacity of 500,000 tons per year.¹¹⁹ A second phase, targeting 3 million tons annually, is slated for completion by 2028.¹²⁰

The military is also advancing a parallel project with China. In January, Ko Ko Lwin confirmed that the Sino-Myanmar crude pipeline would supply the Thanbayarkan refinery in Magway Region, designed to process 2 million tons annually.¹²¹ The project in Minhla Township is being implemented by Sino-Pipeline International.¹²² Fuel shortages have reportedly been recurrent since the coup, worsened by global market volatility and Middle East conflicts.¹²³ Myanmar currently imports 97% of its gasoline and diesel consumption.¹²⁴

Myanmar's military regime launched an official jade auction, the Myanmar Gems Emporium (Ruili) in Jiegao, China.¹²⁵ Jiegao is a Chinese town opposite Muse in northern Shan State. The emporium is the first Myanmar gem auction outside Myanmar's borders and stems from a memorandum of understanding signed between Myanmar's Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation and the Yunnan provincial government in February.¹²⁶ The auction offers 500 tons of rough jadeite, supplied almost entirely by the state-owned Myanmar Gems Enterprise.¹²⁷ The proceeds will reportedly go directly to the Myanmar regime.¹²⁸ *The Irrawaddy* reports that the establishment of the emporium in China is driven by financial strain following territorial losses.¹²⁹ Naypyitaw lost control of its most lucrative mineral hubs to ethnic armed organizations during Operation 1027 in late 2023.¹³⁰

C. Land Seizure

There have been no material updates since the prior report.

V. Peace Talks and Ethnic Violence

A. Ethnic Violence

Throughout July 2026, the military sustained the aerial and ground campaign it had escalated in June, concentrating its firepower on AA-held Rakhine State, resistance-held Chin State, and the central dry zone of Sagaing and Magway. Monitors report that the pattern reflected an intensifying bombing campaign that systematically targets residential areas where no active fighting is under way.¹³¹

In Rakhine State, the Myanmar air force and navy reportedly repeatedly struck AA-administered coastal areas. Between July 7 and July 10, naval vessels fired heavy artillery toward Kyeintali town in Gwa Township, accompanied by airstrikes, reportedly injuring six civilians.¹³² On July 10, airstrikes allegedly hit a school and residential houses in Pauk Tu and Kalar Chaung villages in Gwa Township, killing four civilians, including a child, and severely injuring two others.¹³³ On July 19, the military reportedly carried out a coordinated series of airstrikes on Thandwe, Taungup and Maei townships and on Taungpauk village in Ponnagyun Township, killing five civilians and injuring 29 others.¹³⁴ Children and monks were reportedly

among the victims of the July 19 attacks, which came amid calls by the regime for peace talks.¹³⁵ In Mae town, three 300-pound bombs were allegedly dropped on Wards 2 and 3, killing five civilians and injuring 22 people, including a monk; in Thandwe town the military reportedly attacked with bombs and machine-gun fire, injuring four residents; and near the Taung Pok Monastery in Ponnagyun Township an airstrike injured three people, including two monks.¹³⁶ The Thandwe strikes of July 19 reportedly targeted areas near the Myoma Police Station, the township court and the National Unity Party office.¹³⁷

The bombardment of Rakhine's southern coast intensified in the final week of July. On July 23, a Myanmar fighter jet reportedly twice bombed the Pyi Yadanar (Pearl Yadanar) Monastery and its vicinity in Jittaw Ward, Ngapali, Thandwe Township, at around 12:00 p.m., injuring six people and destroying eight homes; at about 1:30 p.m. a jet dropped two bombs on the AZ Family Resort at Lintha Beach, injuring one resident and damaging bungalows and nearby civilian homes.¹³⁸ The AA announced on July 24 that seven people, including a Buddhist monk and a child, had been injured in the Ngapali attacks.¹³⁹ At least four civilians were reportedly injured and about 20 houses damaged in Ngapali, with 14 houses damaged in Jeittaw Ward and five in Lintha Ward.¹⁴⁰ Shortly after midnight on July 24, a fighter jet reportedly dropped two bombs on the Shwe Yee Restaurant in Ward 7 of Thandwe town, injuring four civilians and damaging several nearby homes.¹⁴¹ Later on July 24, fighter jets allegedly bombed Wards 7 and 8 of Thandwe town, killing three civilians, including a pregnant woman, and injuring 21 others, among them two young children.¹⁴² At least 11 civilians were reportedly injured across the consecutive July 23-24 strikes on Thandwe Township.¹⁴³ On July 27, a fighter jet reportedly dropped two bombs in Lin Bu Taung village, Thandwe Township.¹⁴⁴ Across the month, 12 civilians were reportedly killed and more than 60 injured in Rakhine State as a result of airstrikes and heavy artillery shelling.¹⁴⁵ On the ground, Myanmar military forces reportedly retreated from positions near the Kyaukphyu naval station after heavy clashes with the AA.¹⁴⁶

In Chin State, the Myanmar military completed its recapture of Thantlang. Urban combat continued into early July, with Myanmar military forces occupying roughly half of the town's built-up area while Chin revolutionary forces held the surrounding hills along the Hakha-Thantlang highway and other territory in the township.¹⁴⁷ According to the Myanmar regime, security forces successively regained full control of Thantlang on July 16.¹⁴⁸ The military publicly declared complete control over Thantlang and its surrounding areas following what regime media described as a months-long "counter-terrorism operation," with regime troops photographed in front of a school destroyed during the fighting.¹⁴⁹ In southern Chin State, the Myanmar military reportedly deployed nearly 1,000 reinforcement troops following heavy casualties and tactical setbacks against resistance forces in Mindat and Kanpetlet towns.¹⁵⁰

In Sagaing Region, aerial attacks reportedly continued against schools and villages in July. On July 16, an airstrike on a school in Taline Kyun village, Sagaing Township, allegedly killed two civilians and destroyed four school buildings and three houses.¹⁵¹ On July 26, Myanmar military vessels reportedly fired heavy artillery into two villages in Phaungbyin Township.¹⁵² A further airstrike allegedly targeted Wetlet Township on July 27, causing no casualties because residents of the area had already fled.¹⁵³ On the morning of July 28, Myanmar military airstrikes on Wetlet Township reportedly killed two civilians and injured three others, and approximately 20 homes were destroyed by fire.¹⁵⁴ Airstrikes were again reported in both

Sagaing Township and Wetlet Township at the end of the month.¹⁵⁵ The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project recorded more than a dozen military-perpetrated mass killings nationwide in the first six months of 2026, leaving over 450 civilians dead.¹⁵⁶

Heavy fighting erupted in early July in Nabar Village, Sagaing Region, a strategic junction linking road and rail routes between Sagaing and Kachin State, reportedly leaving at least 800 vehicles—including passenger buses and freight trucks—stranded as both sides have blocked the roads.¹⁵⁷ Since June 30, clashes between Myanmar military troops and allied resistance forces from the KIA, the Kachin PDF, and local PDFs have intensified, with artillery and small-arms fire damaging vehicles and injuring more than 10 passengers, drivers, and assistants.¹⁵⁸ The regime reportedly deployed over 300 troops from the 33rd Light Infantry Division to reinforce nearby Indaw, with another 200 heading toward Wuntho to secure key roads, after resistance forces briefly seized Nabar and Indaw town before losing them in late April.¹⁵⁹ Analysts warn that if the regime captures contested villages along the Shwebo-Myitkyina highway, resistance-held Pinlebu town and one of the last key routes in northern Sagaing could be at risk, while displaced civilians from Indaw, Katha, and Bhamo continue to shelter in nearby areas as fighting intensifies.¹⁶⁰

Myanmar's military has reportedly suffered heavy casualties in a major offensive to break Kayin resistance at Min Let Pan village in Myawaddy District near the Thai-Myanmar border.¹⁶¹ An estimated 2,000 regime troops—supported by allied Kayin factions—are advancing from multiple directions amid intense artillery, shelling and daily drone attacks, with a convoy of 24 vehicles carrying roughly 1,000 additional soldiers and ammunition recently arriving as reinforcements.¹⁶² However, resistance fighters led by the Karen National Liberation Army (“KNLA”) have held their ground despite nine months of southward military pressure from Myawaddy, as the regime seeks to recapture lost territory along the Thai border.¹⁶³ Residents report shells landing on houses, killing and wounding villagers, while Thailand has tightened border security and closed informal crossings after shells and gunfire struck a Thai village—cutting off displaced civilians' access to food markets and shelter across the border.¹⁶⁴ The Karen Peace Support Network reports that between October 2025 and March 2026, the military carried out 1,461 attacks in KNU territory, killing 135 civilians and injuring 270 others.¹⁶⁵

B. Peace Talks

Myanmar's parliament formally rejected ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus on July 9, which called for the cessation of violence as part of a framework for the bloc's continued dialogue with the regime.¹⁶⁶ At an informal meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers in Bangkok on July 12—the first such gathering since the 2021 military coup—the Myanmar Foreign Ministry reportedly stated that peace and stability would be achieved only through a Myanmar-led, Myanmar-owned approach, while pressing ASEAN to restore the country's “full and equal participation” in the bloc.¹⁶⁷ ASEAN foreign ministers pushed back, demanding “concrete actions” toward cessation of hostilities, the release of political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi, and expanded humanitarian access, with Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro—also serving as ASEAN's special envoy on Myanmar—stating the bloc would develop benchmarks to measure progress.¹⁶⁸ In contrast to its official statement supporting the parliament's rejection of the Five-Point Consensus, the regime's foreign minister reportedly confirmed at the Bangkok

meeting that the ASEAN agreement “still exists,” a contradiction the Philippine foreign secretary later highlighted publicly.¹⁶⁹

Despite the regime’s rejection, ASEAN leaders continue to insist the consensus remains the bloc’s roadmap for resolving the crisis, with Singapore and Indonesia emphasizing its centrality to ASEAN’s credibility.¹⁷⁰ Thailand, which hosted the informal meeting, has advocated a policy of “calibrated engagement” and offered to serve as a “bridge” between Myanmar’s generals and ASEAN, with Min Aung Hlaing expected to pay a state visit to Thailand in early August.¹⁷¹

On July 19, representatives from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (“TNLA”) and the Myanmar regime met in response to the regime’s July 31 deadline to engage in peace talks.¹⁷² The TNLA demanded the creation of a self-administered Ta’ang State, which the regime rebuffed, stating that “a Palaung Self-Administered Zone already exists and that the power to grant to full statehood lies with the Union Parliament.”¹⁷³ TNLA is the only ethnic revolutionary organization currently negotiating with the regime and submitted to the talks in the wake of reported pressure from China.¹⁷⁴

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